Public Utility Deregulation and Service Delivery with reference to Electricity Industry: A Theoretical Analysis

Abstract

This study investigates the theoretical foundations and practical outcomes of deregulating public utilities, focusing on the electricity sector and its impact on organizational performance in public and private management. Deregulation, aimed at reducing government control and promoting market dynamics, is often credited with improving efficiency, fostering competition, lowering costs, and driving innovation. However, it also presents challenges such as market failures, monopolies, unequal service access, and profit-driven priorities over public welfare. The research draws on theories like General Equilibrium, Laissez-Faire, Public Choice, Systems Theory, and New Public Management to assess how deregulation shapes organizational structures and decision-making. Using qualitative methods and secondary data, the study highlights deregulation’s dual impact: it promotes efficiency and innovation while requiring robust regulation to address risks and ensure equitable access. The paper emphasizes that effective regulatory frameworks are vital to maximize the benefits of deregulation and safeguard public interests.